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Abstract
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Internal migration plays an important role in moderating 
regional differences in well-being. This paper analyzes 
migrants' choice of destination, using Census and 
Living Standard Surveys data from Nepal. The paper 
examines how the choice of a migration destination is 
influenced by income differentials, distance, population 
density, social proximity, and amenities. The study 
finds population density and social proximity to have 
a strong significant effect: migrants move primarily to 
high population density areas where many people share 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research Group—is part 
of a larger effort in the department to understand the determinants of migration. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at fshilpi@worldbank.org.  
their language and ethnic background. Better access to 
amenities is significant as well. Differentials in expected 
income and consumption expenditures across districts 
are found to be relatively less important in determining 
migration destination choice as their effects are smaller in 
magnitude than those of other determinants. The results 
of the study suggest that an improvement in amenities 
(such as the availability of paved roads) at the origin 
could slow down out-migration substantially.  
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There has been a long tradition of research on migration issues in the development literature
(Greenwood 1975, Borjas 1994). Recent research has highlighted the methodological issues in
estimating returns to migration, in assessing role of migration network in actual migration ﬂows,
a n di ne v a l u a t i n ge ﬀect of migration on economic well being. This literature has contributed
signiﬁcantly to the understanding of migration process and its impacts. But, with the exception
of some on-going studies, there is little evidence on how migrants choose their destination,
particularly in the context of developing countries.1 This paper seeks to ﬁl lt h i sg a pi nt h e
literature. By focusing on the choice of destination, this research seeks to shed light on the
respective role of various locational attributes in the choice of migration destination.
The literature on migrations maintains that diﬀerences in income and infrastructure — suit-
ably corrected for price diﬀerentials — play a dominant role in the choice of a place to live. To
investigate this issue, we develop an original empirical strategy focusing on the choice of desti-
nation conditional on the migration decision. This approach oﬀers the advantage of eliminating
possible biases resulting from unobserved individual heterogeneity. To allow for network eﬀects,
we also correct for correlation in the destination choice of migrants originating from the same
location.
The econometric analysis seeks to identify the main factors inﬂuencing the choice of migration
destination. We limit our analysis to adult males who have migrated outside their birth district
for work reasons. We begin by constructing a measure of expected income diﬀerentials between
the place of origin and all the possible migration destinations. These diﬀerentials are allowed to
vary depending on observable migrant characteristics believed to aﬀect labor market outcomes,
1For instance, Lall and Timmins (2008) are examining the factors that inﬂuence individuals’ migration decisions
in a number of developing countries. This study, among other things, focuses on hetergeneity in migration costs
among diﬀerent socio-economic groups and the role played by diﬀerent amenities in the migration dicisions of
diﬀerent groups.
1such as education and caste. We also construct measures of social proximity between a migrant’s
place of birth and each possible destination, using detailed available data on ethnicity, caste,
language, and religion.
We also investigate a number of factors that may inﬂuence the choice of migration destination
but have not received much attention in the existing literature. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2009)
have shown that the subjective welfare cost of geographical isolation is high. To investigate this
issue, we include regressors controlling for population density and for the average distance to
various amenities. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) have further shown that migrants are concerned
with their welfare relative to that of their birth district as well as to that in their destination
location. We examine whether relative welfare considerations inﬂuence the choice of migration
destination. Additional controls include distance and prices.
The empirical analysis is conducted using LSMS survey data as well as the 2001 population
Census data from Nepal. The diverse terrain of Nepal along with geographical variation in
amenities makes it ideal for our study. The mountainous nature of Nepal means that the
country faces daunting challenges in the provision of transport and energy infrastructure. These
challenges are unique to Nepal, however. Similar constraints are faced by many developing
countries — or regions within such countries. There are also many non-mountainous countries
that nevertheless suﬀer from serious geographical isolation because of the lack of roads. This
applies, for instance, to much of sub-Saharan Africa. Many of the same factors are likely to
aﬀect migration patterns in these countries as well.
I th a sl o n gb e e no b s e r v e dt h a tm i g r a n t so f t e na r eb e t t e re d u c a t e dt h a nn o n - m i g r a n t s . 2 Mi-
grants may diﬀer from non-migrants in terms of unobservables as well. A number of recent
studies have sought to estimate returns to migration that are immune to selection on unob-
2A related strand of work points out that migration prospects raise investment in education (de Brauw and
Giles, 2006; Batista and Vicente, 2008).
2servables (Gabriel and Schmitz,1995; Akee, 2006; and Mckenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 2006).
Their results suggest that simply comparing the earnings of migrants and non-migrants over-
estimates the return to migration. For instance, Mckenzie, Gibson and Stillman (2006) use an
experimental design to show that ignoring selection bias leads to an overestimation of the gains
from migration by 9 to 82 percent. Similar evidence is reported by researchers investigating the
relationship between education and migration (Dahl, 2002).3 Our empirical strategy sidesteps
individual selection issues by controlling for individual ﬁxed eﬀects and by focusing on the choice
of destination conditional on migrating, rather than on the decision to migrate itself.
The role of networks in the migration process has also attracted signiﬁcant recent attention
among economists. Carrington et al. (1996) argue that the presence of a large migrant popula-
tion in the place of destination reduces migration costs and generates path dependence. They
use this to explain the Great Black Migration of 1915-1960 in the US. In the same vein, Munshi
(2003) investigates the role of interpersonal networks in helping Mexican migrant workers in
the US. A similar conclusion is reached by Winters, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2001), also using
Mexican migrants to the US, and by Uhlig (2006) for Germany.4 Network eﬀects also matter
at the place of origin. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005), for instance, show that strong mutual
assistance networks in the place of origin discourages migration. Mora and Taylor (2006) reach
similar conclusions.
We do not have data on social networks and therefore cannot control for network eﬀects
directly. We therefore seek to control for network eﬀects indirectly. Network eﬀects at the
3The view that it is the better educated and more able who migrate has not gone unchallenged, however (Borjas,
1994). According to Borjas’ negative selection hypothesis, the less skilled are those most likely to migrate from
countries/locations with a high skill premia and earnings inequality to countries/locations with a low skill premia
and earnings inequality. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) test and reject this hypothesis for Mexican immigrants in
the US and conclude instead for intermediate selection.
4Using data on refugees resettled in various parts of the US, Beaman (2006) proposes a more complex story in
which an inﬂux of refugees initially overwhelms the network as it struggles to provide job relevant information,
but has longer term positive eﬀect as new migrants ﬁnd their way into employment.
3place of destination tend to favor migrants who are better connected with local residents — and
therefore may have easier access to jobs, credit, information, etc. To capture such eﬀects, we
construct variables that measure social proximity between the migrant and the population mix
at the destination. These variables proxy for network eﬀects but also for possible discrimination.
Network eﬀects also generate correlation in migration decisions among individuals originating
from the same place. This induces correlation in residuals for migrants having the same districts
of origin, and can seriously aﬀect inference. To correct for these eﬀects, we cluster residuals by
district of origin.
Results show that population density, social proximity, and access to amenities exert a strong
inﬂuence on migrants’ choice of destination. These results conﬁrm earlier work on the factors
aﬀecting the subjective welfare cost of isolation (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2008). Diﬀerentials in
income and consumption expenditures play a less important role than anticipated.
The paper is organized as follows. The conceptual framework and testing strategy are pre-
sented in Section 2. The data is discussed in Section 3, together with the main characteristics
of the studied population. Econometric results are presented in Section 4. Conclusions follow.
2 Conceptual framework
Geographical diﬀerences in welfare are expected to induce people to relocate. Migrations pat-
terns thus provide valuable evidence regarding income diﬀerences — or more generally welfare
diﬀerences — across space.
Where do these welfare diﬀerences come from? A frequent explanation of the migration ﬂow
in response to income diﬀerences is derived from the Roy’s (1951) model of job selection where
workers move to the location which provides the highest return to their skill and talent (“un-
observed ability”) (Gabrial and Schmitz, 1995; Dahl, 2002). According to the recent economic
4geography literature (Henderson, 1988; Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999), agglomeration
economies resulting from learning externality and increasing returns cause certain activities to
concentrate in a few urban locations which in turn attract workers to those locations. Lucas
(2004) recently revisited the issue in the context of low income economies during the post-war
period, focusing on the historical issue of rural-urban migration patterns in relation with urban-
ization. In his analysis, Lucas emphasizes the role of cities as places in which new immigrants
can accumulate and earn returns on the skills required by modern production technologies. In
this approach, diﬀerences in welfare across space are driven by diﬀerences in technology — and
diﬀerences in technology result from agglomeration eﬀects leading certain industries to locate in
cities and to take the form of large-scale, modern ﬁrms (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2003 and 2005).
The predominance of large ﬁrms and the emphasis on modern technology would explain why
returns to education are higher in cities and why migrants hoping to move there seek to acquire
more education (e.g., de Brauw and Giles, 2006).
These observations are the starting point for our work. We are interested in the factors that
incite people to move to a speciﬁc location. Standard migration models predict that some of
these factors have to do with the gain from moving, others have to do with the cost — or risk —
of moving. More formally, let us assume that individuals derive a diﬀerent utility from residing
in diﬀerent locations. Let utility of individual h in location i be denoted Uh
i . The probability of
migrating from i to s is expected to increase in the diﬀerence between Uh
s −Uh
i and to fall with
the cost Ch
is of moving from i to s. Our empirical strategy is to construct estimates of Uh
s and
Ch
is for all locations to which a migrant h might have relocated within the study country, and




Following the literature, let us assume that utility Uh
i i saf u n c t i o no ft h ei n c o m eyh
i (or
consumption) that the individual can achieve in location i, of the prices pi he or she faces, and
5av e c t o ro fl o c a t i o n - s p e c i ﬁca m e n i t i e sAi (Bayoh, Irwin and Haab, 2006):
Uh
i = Uh(yh
i ,p i,A i)
≈ yh
i − αpi + βAi
The above linear approximation forms the basis of our empirical estimation. Income yh
i in turn
depends on observable zh and unobservable μh characteristics of individual h:
yh
i = δi + ηizh + γiμh + εh
i (1)
where εh
i is a disturbance independent of zh and μh. Note that parameters ηi and γi vary
across locations. This captures the idea that returns to talent diﬀers with the mix of activities
undertaken in that location (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2005).
Individuals choose the location that gives them the highest expected utility. Let Mh
is describe
h’s choice of destinations: Mh
is =1if individual h migrates from location i to location s,a n d
0 otherwise. By construction, each individual only migrates to a single location. We have to
control for the cost of migrating. If people are credit constrained, or if they are risk averse and
there is friction in the circulation of information, they would not want to travel too far. There
is also the issue of social interaction with neighbors and friends in the place of destination (for
entertainment, mutual support, marriage market, etc.). As recent papers by Munshi (2003)
and Beaman (2006) have shown, social networks also play a role in ﬁnding employment. Social
distance may thus discourage movement.
We therefore assume that the cost of moving from i to s depends on the physical and social
distance between i and s (e.g., including diﬀerences in religion, language, or caste). Let dh
is
denote a vector of physical and social distances, where we recognize that social distance depends
6on characteristics of individual h.W eh a v e :
Pr(Mh




i |zh,μh) − ωdh
is

= λ(δs − δi +( ηs − ηi)zh +( γs − γi)μh
−α(ps − pi)+β(As − Ai) − ωdh
is) (2)
where λ(.) is the logit function. Since we condition on migrating, the dependent variable takes
value 1 for one and only one destination. This means that we can only identify the eﬀect
of diﬀerences between destinations, not the likelihood of migrating itself. This is standard in
multiple discrete choice estimation (Train, 2003).
In practice, we do not observe individual h in two locations at the same time. How can we
estimate (2)? We proceed as follows. We begin by estimating equation (1), separately for each
location. This yields an estimate of:
g E[yh
s − yh
i |zh]=e δs −e δi +( e ηs −e ηi)zh
for each possible destination. We then use e δs −e δi and (e ηs −e ηi)zh to estimate equation (2) for
migrants only. If income diﬀerences drive migration, the coeﬃcients of e δs −e δi and (e ηs −e ηi)zh
should be positive and signiﬁcant, and they should be equal.
How adequately does this approach take care of unobserved heterogeneity? We begin by
noting that, in general E[zhμh]  =0 : observable and unobservable talents are correlated. For
those who wish to estimate the return to a speciﬁc individual characteristic zh, this correlation
is problematic. For our purpose, this correlation is good news. To see this, consider the extreme
7case in which μh is a deterministic function of zh:
μh = λzh
Inserting in (1), we get:
yh
i = δi +( ηi + γiλ)zh + εh
i
In this case the estimated coeﬃcient of zh also captures the eﬀect of unobserved heterogeneity
on income:
E[e ηi]=ηi + γiλ
and (e ηs −e ηi)zh in equation (2) controls for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
What happens if zh and μh are only imperfectly correlated? Say we have:
μh = λzh + vh
with E[vh]=0and E[zhvh]=0 . Inserting in (1), we get:
yh
i = δi +( ηi + γiλ)zh + γivh + εh
i
It follows that:
plim[e δi]=δi + γiplim[vh]=δi
For the above to hold, we need to estimate (1) on all individuals, migrants and non-migrants.
This is not possible, of course, since migrants are not observed in their place of origin. Fortu-
nately, in the studied country, the overwhelming majority of household heads still reside in
their birth village, probably because the economic and psychological costs of migrating are high.
8This means that the distribution of unobserved talent μh among district residents corresponds
roughly to the distribution of talent in the population at large. This implies that the bias in
estimating δi is probably small when we estimate (1) using data on district residents.
What of equation (2)? It can be rewritten:
Pr(Mh
is =1 ) = f+[δs − δi +(ηs − ηi + λ(γs − γi))zh




is ≡ (γs − γi)vh
which shows that since vh is uncorrelated with zh by construction, (e ηs−e ηi)zh is uncorrelated with
the disturbances. The above can thus be used to consistently test whether income diﬀerences
drive the choice of migration destination.
We have discussed unobserved heterogeneity in income generation. There can also be un-
observed heterogeneity in migration costs. We are particularly concerned about the large pro-
portion of surveyed households who still live in their birth district. This population includes
households who chose not to migrate, but also many households for whom the cost — or the
risk — of migrating were probably too high. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005), for instance, have
shown that mutual insurance within castes in India provides a strong disincentive to migrate.
The same probably applies to our study country, which is neighboring India. It follows that the
decision not to migrate at all — Mh
ii =1— is distinct from the choice of a destination, conditional
on migrating. To minimize the bias that self-selection into migration may generate, we drop
Mh
ii and estimate (3) with migrants only. Since we have no data on individuals who have left
the country, our analysis is only pertinent to internal migrants.
Estimation of model (3) is achieved as follows. We begin by generating, for each migrant,
9N − 1 observations on Mh
is and the regressors, where N is the number of possible locations.5
We then estimate (3) by logit.6 Since the same individual appears N − 1 times, we have to
correct for correlation between the diﬀerent choices for the same individual h.W e d o s o ﬁrst
by adding individual ﬁxed eﬀects. This takes care of much of the correlation. We also correct
standard errors for clustering by district of origin. This takes care of possible peer eﬀects, as
would arise if individuals from a given location all tend to migrate to the same destination.
Robust standard errors that cluster by district of origin also correct for negative correlation in
errors across choices for the same individual, a possibility that ﬁxed eﬀects do not control for.
Negative correlation is a serious issue here, a point that is discussed in more detail in the next
section.
We worry about possible circularity resulting from general equilibrium eﬀects (Dahl, 2002;
Hojvat-Gallin, 2004; Borjas, 2006; Bayer, Khan and Timmins, 2008). If many people migrate
t oas p e c i ﬁc location, such as the capital city, this is likely to aﬀect wages, incomes, and access
to amenities in that location.7 This would generate a potential endogeneity bias due to the fact
that incomes and amenities in that location result in part from the decision of many migrants
to locate there.
To eliminate this bias, we use past data to estimate the income regression. More precisely,
let T b et h ep e r i o df o rw h i c hw eh a v ei n c o m ei n f o r m a t i o na n dT + t the period at which we
5The dropped observation corresponds to the location of origin M
h
ii which, as explained earlier, we do not
include in the analysis since including M
h
ii would mean de facto including the decision of whether to migrate or
not.
6McFadden (1974) has shown that, in multiple choice problems of the kind studied here, the application of logit
estimation is justiﬁed if (1) the errors in each latent choice equation follow the extreme value distribution and (2)
errors are independent across choices. See Train (2003), Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion. The estimation of
models with correlated errors across choices requires either multiple integration or the use of Bayesian estimation
techniques relying on Gibbs sampling. With a choice of over 70 possible destinations, multiple integration is out of
the question. Gibbs sampling remains a possibility but would require extensive programming. We choose instead
to keep the logit approach but to correct the standard errors for possible correlation in errors across choices. In
our case the possible eﬃciency gain achieved by Bayesian methods does not appear to justify the programming
cost.
7The eﬀect could be negative — e.g., congestion — or positive — e.g., agglomeration externalities.
10observe migrants. The income regression is estimated using data for period T. Migrants are
deﬁned as those who migrated between T and T + t. This implies that migration decision are
assumed to be taken based on income diﬀerentials at time T, that is, prior to the time at which
migrants choose their destination.8 This appears to be a reasonable assumption given that most
migrants in our dataset come from rural areas of Nepal and are unlikely to be particularly good
at forecasting diﬀerential income trends in multiple locations.
We also examine whether migrants consider relative incomes — rather than absolute incomes
— when deciding where to migrate. This point was already touched upon by Stark and Taylor
(1991) who showed that households’ relative deprivation in their village reference group is sig-
niﬁcant in explaining migration to destinations where a reference group substitution is unlikely
and the returns to migration are high. More recent work in economics and psychology has shown
that subjective well-being depends on relative achievement, of which one dimension is income
(see Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2008 and 2009 for brief surveys of the literature). This raises the
question of whether people choose the migration destination that, on the basis of their individual
characteristics, promises them a high income relative to that of others in that location. To this
eﬀect, we replace yh
i with yh
i /yi in equation (1) and proceed as outlined above. If migration
decisions are based on relative rather than absolute income, then the coeﬃcients of e δs −e δi and
(e ηs −e ηi)zh should be positive and signiﬁcant only when they are computed using yh
i /yi.
In addition to relative and absolute income diﬀerences, the analysis also examines the re-
spective roles of various location characteristics such as housing and food prices, availability of
public services, and density of human settlement.
8An alternative strategy for the estimation of pre-migration income distribution in cross-section data is sug-
gested by Bayer, Khan and Timmins (2008).
113 The data
Having described the conceptual framework and estimation strategy, we now present the data.
The data used in this paper come from two sources: living standard household surveys, and the
population census.
The living standard data come from two rounds of Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS).
The ﬁrst round was conducted in 1995/96 while the second took place in 2002/3. The NLSS
surveys collected detailed information on households and individuals using nationally represen-
tative samples. The 1995/96 NLSS survey is used as source of detailed information about locally
available amenities. It is also used to estimate the income regression (1).
Survey data are complemented with information from the 2001 population census. The
short population census questionnaire was administered to the whole population. It contains
information about ethnicity and caste. For a randomly selected 11% of the census population,
additional information was collected using a second, longer questionnaire. This questionnaire
collected information on district of current residence, district of residence 5 years prior to the
census, and district of origin. Detailed information is also available on gender, age, education,
unemployment, occupation, and motive for migration, if any. The Nepalese Central Bureau of
Statistics was kind enough to merge the short and long questionnaire datasets for the 11% of
the population covered by the long questionnaire. This provides a very large data set on which
we estimate the migration regression (3).
Nepal is divided into 75 districts and further subdivided into 3,915 VDCs and 35,235 wards.
The 11% population census covers approximately 2.5 million individuals in 520,624 households.
345,349 of these individuals are living in a district other than their district of residence and
119,475 have moved in the ﬁve years preceding the census, that is, in the period between the
1995/96 NLSS and the 2001 census. Most of these individuals have moved for reasons other
12than work. Marriage is the dominant reason for moving among women; study is the dominant
reason for moving among children and youths. In contrast, of the adult males who migrated
during last 5 years, 69% moved for work reasons.
Because our focus is on work migration, we restrict our attention to adult males. Among
those, 16,850 are recorded as having moved in the ﬁve years preceding the census speciﬁcally for
work reasons. These individuals are the focus of our analysis. We note that, by construction,
this approach excludes those who have migrated outside Nepal. Our focus is thus on internal
migrants. We do not have data on India but since there is no big Indian city within 200
km of Nepalese border, commuting to India for work while residing in a Nepalese district is
rare, making it unlikely that economic opportunities in neighboring India aﬀected the choice of
migration destination within Nepal.
Figures 1 and 2 show the geographical distribution of work migrants in terms of district
of residence and origin. Districts with a high concentration of work migrants relative to non-
migrant adult males appear in red, those with a low concentration appear in blue. We see that
a small number of destination districts have a high proportion of work migrants. In contrast,
districts of origin are distributed widely across the country. This reﬂects the fact that much
work migration is from remote rural areas to towns and cities.
The main characteristics of work migrants are reported in Table 1, together with those of non-
migrant adult males. We see that work migrants are on average younger and better educated.
The census contains detailed information about ethnicity, language, and religion. In the Nepal
census, the term ‘ethnicity’ is used to capture a hodgepodge of caste and tribal distinctions.
The census distinguishes up to 103 ethnic categories. Most of these categories only account
for a tiny proportion of the total population. In terms of the total adult population, the most
common ethnic categories are Chhetri, Brahmin, and Newar who, together, account for 35% of
13adult males in the 11% census. All three categories are regarded as upper castes. As we see
from Table 1, migrants are much more likely to be upper caste than non-migrants.
The census distinguishes 84 diﬀerent languages. The main ones are Nepali and Maithili,
spoken by 58% of the population. In Table 1 we see that work migrants are much more likely to
speak Nepali, the main language in the country. While the Nepalese population is heterogeneous
in terms of ethnicity and language, it is relatively homogeneous in terms of religion: 81% of adult
males are Hindu and 11% are Buddhist. We see in Table 1 that work migrants are predominantly
Hindu.
The dependent variable Mh
is in our main regression of interest, regression (3), is constructed
as follows. We begin by creating, for each of the 16850 work migrants h identiﬁed in the 11%
census, 75 Mh
is observations corresponding to each of the possible 75 district destinations s.W e
set Mh
is =1if migrant h moved from district i to district s in the 5 years preceding the census,
and 0 otherwise. We then drop Mh
ii since we focus on migrants. By construction a migrant
reside in one district. For each migrant, variable Mh
is thus takes value 1 once and value 0 73
times.
Since the migrant can only move to a single destination, the 74 Mh
is observations are not
independent and residuals in (3) are correlated. Dependence across Mh
is observations combines
negative and positive correlation. To illustrate this point, imagine for a moment that all destina-
tions are equivalently attractive to the migrant. The probability Pr(Mh
is =1 )of selecting one of
them is thus 1/74. Further assume that one of them is selected at random; for this observation,
we have uh
is =1− Pr(Mh
is =1 )=7 3 /74. For all other observations, the residual uh
is = −1/74.
We see that, for individual h, the observation in which Mh
is =1is negative correlated with
observations in which Mh
is =0 . We also see that observations in which Mh
is =0are positively
correlated with each other. This combination of positive and negative correlation means that a
14standard ﬁxed or random eﬀect approach is not suﬃcient to ensure correct inference; clustering
standard errors by individual is necessary. This is what we do.
Having described how the dependent variable is constructed, we turn to regressors. We begin
by describing how we construct an estimate of g E[yh
s|zh], the level of income (or consumption)
yh
s that a migrant with characteristics zh c a ne x p e c tt oe a r ni nd i s t r i c ts. To construct such
estimate, we use the 1995/96 NLSS data. The reason for using the 1995/96 data instead of the
2002/3 NLSS survey is to avoid reverse causation, i.e., migration causing a change in income
patterns. Migrants are unlikely to be able to accurately predict the evolution of incomes in
each district over time. Income and consumption levels observable before migration are thus a
reasonable starting point.
Using the NLSS data we begin by estimating a regression of the form:
yk






s is the log of income (or consumption) of household k residing in district s,c o e ﬃcients
δs,βs and χs vary by district, ak
s stands for the age and age squared of the household head,
Ek
s is the education level of the head measured in years of completed education, and Hk
s =1
if the head belongs to what we have earlier classiﬁed as a high caste (i.e., Brahmin, Chhetri or
Newar). Since income or consumption are expressed in logs, βs and χs can be thought of as
education and high caste premia, respectively. Female headed households are excluded from the
regression since the focus is on migrant males. Vector a denotes the average age and age squared
of observations across the sample. Variables E and Hs denote the district-speciﬁca v e r a g e so f
Ek
s and Hk
s. By demeaning regressors, we ensure that e δs measures the unconditional, district-
speciﬁc average of yk
s. Marital status, household size, and other household characteristics are
15not included because they are possibly aﬀected by migration.9 In contrast, age, education, and
caste status can be regarded as exogenous to the migration decisions of adult males. Equation
(4) is estimated using correct sampling weights.10
Regression estimates for equation (4) are summarized in Table 2 where we show α as well
as the average and standard error of δs,βs and χs.T h e c o e ﬃcients e δi and e ηi are large and
jointly signiﬁcant. There is considerable variation across districts not only in average log income
and consumption but also in the income or consumption premia associated with education and
high caste. These results are used to construct, for each of the 16,000 or so work migrants in
the census, a measure of the income or consumption they can expect to achieve in each of the
possible destination districts. Formally, this measure is calculated as:
g E[yh
s|zh]=e δs + e βs(Eh
s − Es)+e χs(Hh
s − Hs) (5)
where Eh
s and Hh
s are the education and high caste dummy for migrant h. Age is ignored
from the calculation since work migrants typically migrate around the same age, i.e., in early
adulthood.
Formula (5) can be decomposed into two parts: e δs, which measures the average income level
in district s,a n de ηszh ≡ e βs(Eh
s −Es)+e χs(Hh
s −Hs) which captures individual-speciﬁcv a r i a t i o n
in income. Migration models predict that, other things being equal, the choice of migration
destination should depend on g E[yh
s|zh]. This means that if we regress the choice of destination
separately on e δs and e ηszh, they should have the same coeﬃcient.
The same methodology is used to construct other variables that may aﬀect the choice of
9The literature has often emphasized that migrations often serve an important role in household formation.
For migrants, the prospect of forming a large, successful household is likely to be one of the purposes of migration.
10The 1995/96 NLSS survey adopted the following sampling strategy. Within each district a small number of
wards were selected at random. Within each ward, 12 randomly selected households were interviewed. Because
the wards diﬀer widely in terms of population, applying sampling weights is essential in order to obtain consistent
estimates of δs.
16destination. Building on a growing literature documenting the relationship between subjective
welfare and relative income, Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) show that Nepalese households care
about their consumption level relative to that of others in the same location. If this is the case, it
is conceivable that migrants choose their destination not so much for the absolute gain in income
it may provide but for the gain in relative status that would ensue. For instance, if returns to
education and ability are higher in an urban setting, an educated individual may improve his
relative position in society by moving from a rural to an urban setting. To investigate this
possibility, we estimate equation (4) using the log of relative income (or relative consumption)
as dependent variable and construct a predicted relative income measure using the same formula
(5). These are shown in the second panel of Table 1.
Theories of work migration predict that individuals move to increase their utility or welfare.
The 1995/96 NLSS asked respondents a number of questions regarding their subjective satisfac-
tion level with various dimensions of consumption — namely, food, clothing, housing, health care,
and child schooling. They were also asked their subjective satisfaction with their level of total
income. We apply the same methodology to these data — i.e., we estimate a regression of the
same form as (4) and apply formula (5) to construct an expected subjective satisfaction index. If
migrants correctly anticipate the subjective satisfaction they will enjoy from moving to diﬀerent
destinations, these subjective satisfaction measures may oﬀer a better way of controlling for
expected welfare diﬀerences across destinations.
To control for migration costs, we construct variables proxying for geographical and social
distance. For geographical distance between districts, we use the arc distance between the
district of origin and each possible district of destination, computed from the longitude and
latitude of each districts’ administrative center. We expect the cost and risk of migration to
increase with physical distance.
17Social distance is proxied by the proportion of individuals in the district who share the
same language, religion, and ethnic group. This is implemented as follows. From the census
we have information on ethnic, religious, and language diversity in all districts of the country.
From these we construct an index of similarity between individual h and the population of each
district. Let m denote a speciﬁc trait — e.g., ethnicity, religion or language — and let pm
s be the
proportion of the population of district s that has trait m. Consider the trait mh of individual
h.W ee x p e c th’s chances of ﬁnding a job, etc, to increase in the proportion of individuals in the
district of destination who share the same trait. We therefore construct, for each destination
a n de a c hm i g r a n t ,av a r i a b l epmh
s equal to the proportion of members of h’s with trait mh.F o r
this migrant, the social distance between two locations i and s is pmh
s − p
mh
i . The idea behind
this measure is that individual h ‘ﬁt s ’b e t t e ri nd i s t r i c ts if the proportion of like individuals is
higher than in his district of origin. We construct similar indices for language and religion. Note
the similarity between pmh
s and the commonly used index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization
(ELF). The ELF index measures the probability that two individuals taken at random belong
to the same ethnic or linguistic group. Variable pmh
s measures the probability that an individual
taken at random belongs to the same ethnic or linguistic group as the migrant and is thus the
individual-equivalent of the ELF index for groups.
We seek to control for price diﬀe r e n c e sa c r o s sl o c a t i o n s .T h i si sd i ﬃc u l tb e c a u s ew ed on o t
have detailed price data. We are mostly concerned about housing costs and prices of common
household goods.
We use the price of rice as a proxy for the price of common household goods. This is not
entirely satisfactory but in the absence of a district-level consumer price index this is the best
we can do. Given the mountainous nature of the country, rice cannot be grown in many parts of
the country. The price of rice thus tends to rise with altitude and geographical isolation, as we
18expect the prices of many manufactures to do as well. The 1995/96 NLSS collected information
on the quantity and price paid for rice by individual households. From this we compute a unit
price per Kg. The log of the district median is used as our price index proxy.
To construct an index of housing costs, we take advantage of a section of the 1995/96
NLSS survey focusing on housing. The survey collected information on hypothetical and actual
house rental values of each household together with house characteristics such as square footage,
number and type of rooms, quality of materials, and the availability of various utilities. We use
these data to construct an hedonistic index of housing costs for each district. Let rk
s be the
house rental price paid (or estimated) by household h in district s and let xh
s denote a vector of
house characteristics. We estimate a regression of the form:
logrk
s = as + bxh
s + ek
s
to obtain estimates of e as, the housing cost premium in each district s. Regression results are
shown in Table A1 in appendix. Many house characteristics are signiﬁcant with the expected
sign, e.g., larger, better built houses with better in-house amenities are worth more. District
price diﬀerentials are large and jointly signiﬁcant. Since the dependent variable is in log form,
e as measures the housing cost premium in each district.
To the extent that people are mobile, housing price diﬀerentials capture, in a reduced form,
the eﬀect of location attributes such as proximity to jobs and access to public amenities. It is
therefore possible for migrants to be attracted by districts which command a high housing price
premium. To further control for access to amenities, we include travel time to the nearest road
(a measure of market access) and to the nearest bank (a measure of ﬁnancial and commercial
development).
We include a number of regressors to control for geographical isolation. Fafchamps and Shilpi
19(2009) have shown that, in Nepal, subjective welfare is negatively associated with geographical
isolation. Census data on total population and population density in each district are used
as proxies for urbanization and geographical proximity: the denser the population, the less
geographically isolated individuals are likely to be. We also include data on the average elevation
in each district. Nepal being a mountainous country, the higher the average elevation of a district,
the more costly it is to build roads, raising transport and delivery costs to the district. Ceteris




We now investigate the choice of migration destination. We begin with simple univariate analysis.
Variables are of the form ∆h
is = xh
s −xh
i where i is the district of origin of migrant h and s is each
of 74 possible districts of destination. We examine the average value of ∆h
is for the destination
district and compare it to the value of ∆h
is for alternative destinations. For instance, let xh
s
be population density in district s. The average value of ∆h
is for the actual destination of the
migrant tells us whether the destination district is more densely populated than the district of
origin. The comparison between ∆h
is for actual and hypothetical destinations tells us whether
the actual district of destination is more densely populated than alternative destinations.
Results are presented in Table 3 for all variables used in the analysis. We begin with district
log income e δs.W eh a v et w oe s t i m a t e so fe δs, one obtained using reported income data, and the
other based on reported consumption data. Given that most respondents to the NLSS survey
are self-employed, measurement error is typically larger for income than for consumption. We
see that our estimates of log income and consumption e δs are on average 20% and 8% higher in
20the district of destination than in the district of origin, respectively. Migrating to one of the 73
alternative destinations would, on average, have reduced income and consumption relative to
the district of origin. The diﬀerence in anticipated income and consumption between actual and
hypothetical destinations is strongly signiﬁcant. Migrants thus tend to move to districts where
consumption and income are higher.
Next we examine whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in returns to individual character-
istics e ηszh. Surprisingly, results for income show that e ηszh is on average lower in the district of
destination than in the district of origin. The diﬀerence is large enough to be statistically sig-
niﬁcant. This implies that better educated, high caste migrants are expected to gain relatively
less from migrating to actual destination districts than less educated, lower caste migrants. In
contrast, e ηszh estimates based on consumption data show an increase relative to the district of
origin. This suggests that better educated, high class migrants would gain more from migrating.
We also observe a slightly stronger increase for the actual destination than in the alternatives.
The diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant, however.
Diﬀerences in relative log income and consumption are displayed next. Predicted relative
log income and consumption are generated using the same formula e δs +e βs(Eh
s −Es)+e χs(Hh
s −
Hs) used for log income, except that, by construction, e δs =0always. We see that relative
income falls between the district of origin and the district of destination while it would have
risen in alternative destinations. The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. In contrast, relative
consumption is higher in the destination district than in the district of origin or in alternative
destinations but the diﬀerence between actual and hypothetical destinations is not signiﬁcant.
We then turn to diﬀerences in subjective welfare. The equivalent of e δs is used as for log
income. We begin with subjective perceptions regarding the adequacy of total income. Relative
to their district of origin, the average subjective satisfaction with total income is found to rise
21between the district of origin and the district of destination. Whether this is fully anticipated
by migrants is unclear. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) show that in assessing their subjective
satisfaction migrants still compare themselves to those in their district of origin.
Results regarding subjective satisfaction from the consumption of food, clothing, housing,
health care, and schooling are shown next. We see that in all cases the district of destination has
a much larger level of subjective satisfaction, both relative to the district of origin and relative
to other possible destinations. We also compute the equivalent of e ηszh and ﬁnd it to be negative
in ﬁve out of six cases. This is consistent with the fall in returns to education and high caste
that was found for income between the districts of origin and destination.
We then turn to prices and amenities. We observe on average an 9% fall in the median price of
rice between the districts of origin and destination. Migrating to alternative destinations would
have raised the price of rice instead of reducing it. This is consistent with our interpretation that
the price of rice in part captures diﬀerences in delivery costs driven by isolation. In contrast,
we ﬁnd a 38% average increase in the rental cost of housing between the districts of origin and
destination. Moving to an alternative destination would also have raised average housing costs
but by less than that in the actual destination district. Travel time to various facilities and
infrastructures falls uniformly between the district of origin and that of destination. Since these
diﬀerences are strongly correlated with each other, we only report two: travel time to the nearest
road, and travel time to the nearest bank. Both fall massively between district of origin and
destination, and both would have risen had the migrant moved to an alternative destination.
We observe a strong negative diﬀerence in elevation between the district of origin and district
of destination. Moving to an alternative destination would, on average, have resulted in a higher
elevation than the district of origin. This implies that migrants on average move down from the
mountains. They also tend to go to districts with a larger and more dense population than the
22district of origin and alternative destinations. Migration is thus primarily from rural to urban
areas.
In terms of social proximity, we see that migrants on average face a population that is
more diﬀerent from them in terms of both language and caste/ethnicity than it would be in
their district of origin. This is true for the actual destination district but also for alternative
districts. We do not observe the same pattern for religion; if anything, migrants are more likely
to face someone of their religion in their district of destination. The diﬀerence is small, however.
Finally, the geographical distance between the district of origin and the actual destination is on
average smaller than that between the district of origin and alternative destinations: if anything,
migrants tend to go to a district that is closer. The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁc a n tb u ti ti s
not large, however.
To summarize, simple bivariate analysis shows that migrants tend to move to a district
with: a larger population and population density; a lower elevation and closer proximity to
the district of origin; a higher average income and consumption; higher subjective consumption
adequacy; lower rice prices and higher housing costs; better access to public amenities. In
contrast, migrants move to districts where they have a lower relative income compared to their
district of origin. They also tend to move to districts where fewer people speak their language
or share their religion.
4.2 Multivariate analysis
We have seen that there are strong diﬀerences between actual and alternative migration desti-
nations. Many of these characteristics are correlated with each other, however. To disentangle
them we turn to multivariate analysis and estimate the migration regression (3). As explained in
the previous section, regressors include: prices as described above; geographical and social dis-
23tance; and access to amenities. We also include the log of total population, population density,
and average elevation as additional controls.
We begin by estimating (3) with e δs − e δi computed from the log income data. Results are
shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 4. As discussed earlier, reported results include individual
ﬁxed eﬀects and standard errors clustered by district of origin. The univariate analysis showed
that income was signiﬁcant on its own. Once we control for distance, population, prices and
amenities, however, the diﬀerence in expected income is no longer signiﬁcant. Most of other
variables are, though. Distance has the expected negative sign — on average the migration
destination is closer to the district of origin than alternative destinations. The destination
district also has a signiﬁcantly larger population and population density, a lower elevation,
and a lower rice price. Housing costs in contrast are higher in the destination district than in
alternative destinations, possibly because they control for the availability of amenities and other
public goods. We also see that the destination district has a signiﬁcantly shorter average travel
time to the nearest road. Once we control for road distance, travel time to the nearest bank is
no longer signiﬁcant.
The univariate analysis showed that migrants on average move to destinations where they
are on average less likely to ﬁnd people like them. The results presented in Table 4 present
ad i ﬀerent picture. Conditional on the other regressors, the ethnicity and language proximity
indices are signiﬁcant with the anticipated sign: social proximity between the migrant and the
population of the destination district is higher than in alternative destinations. The religion
proximity index is not signiﬁcant. Taken together, these results suggest that, conditional on
material beneﬁts from migration, migrants prefer to move to a destination where they integrate
more easily — and possibly enjoy network beneﬁts in terms of access to jobs and housing (Munshi
2003, Beaman 2006).
24It is surprising that income diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant once we control for geography,
population, prices and amenities. This may be because we have not included individual-speciﬁc
income diﬀerentials across districts. We therefore reestimate (3) with (e ηs −e ηi)zh as well as
e δs−e δi. Results are shown in column 2 of Table 4. They remain non-signiﬁc a n t .I nc o l u m n3w e
replace absolute diﬀerences in log income with relative diﬀerences. The constructed regressor,
which by construction depends only on (e ηs −e ηi)zh, remains non-signiﬁcant. Finally in column
4w ec o m p u t ee δs − e δi and (e ηs −e ηi)zh using answers to the question regarding the subjective
adequacy of total income. Estimate coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, but with opposite signs: only
the (e ηs −e ηi)zh part as the anticipated positive sign.
It is conceivable that these surprising and disappointing results are driven by measurement
error in income. It is indeed well known that income is notoriously diﬃcult to measure in poor,
primarily self-employed populations. To investigate this possibility, we reestimate (3) using
NLSS consumption data to construct e δs −e δi and (e ηs −e ηi)zh.
Results, shown in Table 5, are more in line with expectations. Although average log con-
sumption in the district is not signiﬁcant, the coeﬃcient of the (e ηs −e ηi)zh is strongly signiﬁcant,
and so is the coeﬃcient of the combined e δs−e δi+( e ηs −e ηi)zh variable. We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
positive coeﬃcient when the combined e δs −e δi+( e ηs −e ηi)zh variable is constructed using rela-
tive rather than absolute log consumption. If we include e δs −e δi+( e ηs −e ηi)zh computed both
from absolute and relative income, neither of them is signiﬁcant, probably because they are too
strongly correlated. We cannot therefore discern whether it is absolute or relative standards of
living that aﬀect the choice of migration destination.
We also estimate similar regressions using subjective consumption adequacy questions to
construct e δs − e δi and (e ηs −e ηi)zh. Results, not shown here to save space, are generally non-
signiﬁcant. The only exception is food consumption but, as we found in column 4 of Table 4,
25estimated coeﬃcients have opposite signs so the results are diﬃcult to interpret.
4.3 Robustness checks
We conduct numerous robustness checks. We ﬁrst try to understand the contradiction between
the univariate and multivariate results. To this eﬀect, we estimate a series of simple regressions
that include g E[yh
s|zh] (measured in terms of income or consumption) together with one of the
additional regressors appearing in Tables 4 and 5. We ﬁnd that g E[yh
s|zh] remains highly sig-
niﬁcant with all regressors with a single exception: as soon as the average travel time to the
nearest road is included in the regression, g E[yh
s|zh] loses all signiﬁcance. We already know from
Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) that income is strongly negatively correlated with geographical iso-
lation. What this suggests is that once we control for geographical isolation, income diﬀerentials
no longer matter. Similar ﬁndings are reported for Brazil and Mexico by Timmins (2008), using
ad i ﬀerent methodology.
Next, we investigate in diﬀerent ways whether our failure to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant income eﬀect
in Tables 4 and 5 is due to income mismeasurement. The income regression (4) does not control
for household size and composition. The rationale for doing so is that (1) household size and
composition may be endogenous to the migration decision — e.g., individuals who migrate to the
city may opt to have a smaller household — and that (2) migrants may derive satisfaction from the
total income jointly earned by the household they head. However, not correcting for household
size and composition a higher predicted income g E[yh
s|zh] in districts where households are larger
and there are more work opportunities for household dependents — typically rural districts. To
investigate whether this is responsible for the low income coeﬃcients, we include the log of
household size and the share of adult males and females in the income regression (4) and we
replicate the analysis using the revised g E[yh
s|zh]. The results, which are not shown here to save
26space, are virtually undistinguishable of those reported in Tables 4 and 5.
Central to our estimation are estimates of income and consumption levels enjoyed by house-
holds in various districts. To check the robustness of our results, we reestimate all income
and consumption regressions (4) using non-migrants only. The reason for doing so is that non-
migrants represent the bulk of the population and thus E[vh|do not migrate] ≈ E[vh].R e g r e s s i o n
results, not shown here to save space, are disappointing: if anything, income and consumption
variables are even less signiﬁcant.
This strategy does not control for possible self-selection: if more talented individuals migrate,
remaining households may be less productive. As a result, they may earn less than migrants in
the same location. To correct for the self-selection of non-migrants we need variables that aﬀect
the decision to migrate but are unlikely to aﬀect income. Family background variables such
as the education and occupation of the father may serve this purpose because they aﬀect the
ability of the migrant’s father to help ﬁnance the cost of migration. Given that most migrants
migrate early in their adult life, it is reasonable to expect that parental inﬂuences play a role
in the decision to migrate — and in the ﬁnancing of migration costs. We use the education and
occupation of the father to construct two selection correction terms for the income regressions
— one selection term for migrants, and one for non-migrants (Wooldridge, p. 631):
yk







+ ρ2(1 − m)
φ(ze θ)
1 − Φ(ze θ)
+ vk
s (6)
where φ(ze θ) and Φ(ze θ) are the normal density function and cumulative distribution from the
selection regression of migrant status m on determinants z.
The selection regression is shown in Table A2 in Appendix. Other variables are the same as
27those appearing in the income and consumption regressions (4). We see that family background
variables are signiﬁcant. Using this selection regression we construct the two Mills ratio shown
in equation (6), one for migrants and one for non-migrants, and we reestimate the income and
consumption regressions with these additional regressors, obtain corrected e δs and e ηs estimates,
and reestimate the destination choice regressions. Results are nearly indistinguishable from
those reported in Tables 4 and 5. They are omitted here to save space.
When constructing g E[yh
s|zh] we implicitly assume that migrants are well informed about
incomes in all potential destinations. But it is possible that they are better informed about
certain destinations, for instance, destinations chosen by migrants from their district in the past.
Failing to control for this possibility may lead to an attenuation bias in the income coeﬃcient.
To investigate this possibility, we interacted the income variable with a proxy for the availability
of income information. If migrants only respond to income diﬀerences for those districts on
which they have more accurate information, the coeﬃcient of the interacted term should be
signiﬁcant even if the uninteracted term is not. As proxy for the availability of information, we
use the number of adult males who migrated more than 5 years ago (that is before the migrants
themselves) from the district of origin to each of the districts of destination. The coeﬃcient of
the interacted term is minuscule in magnitude and uniformly non-signiﬁcant. The same ﬁnding
obtains whether we use all migrants or only work migrants.
As a ﬁnal robustness check, we reestimate the model using migrant data from the NLSS
2002/03. The number of migrants is signiﬁcantly smaller, so results may be less precise. The
advantage of this approach is that it serves as cross-validation. Results are presented in Tables
6 and 7. Table 6 should be compared with Table 4, and Table 7 with Table 5.
Comparing Tables 6 and 4, we again ﬁnd that anticipated income, whether absolute or
relative, is either non-signiﬁcant or negative. Most of our other results obtain. Exceptions
28include the rice price — which appears with the wrong sign but is only marginally signiﬁcant
— and elevation and population density — which are no longer signiﬁcant. Comparing Tables 7
and 5, we ﬁnd that in the smaller NLSS 2002/3 dataset none of the anticipated consumption
variables is statistically signiﬁcant. Other results are as before.
4.4 Magnitude
To assess the relative magnitude of our results, we multiply coeﬃcients estimated in Tables 4
and 5 by the standard deviation of their respective regressors. We then average over the various
regressions reported in Tables 4 and 5. Calculations are summarized in Table 8. The larger the
v a l u e ,t h em o r ei n ﬂuence the regressor has on the choice of a destination district.
We see that the most important regressors in terms of magnitude are travel time to the near-
est road, elevation, language similarity, and the price of rice. Consumption variables have an
eﬀect on migration destination that is smaller in magnitude: a one standard deviation increase
in anticipated relative consumption, for instance, has an eﬀect on destination that corresponds
to a third of the eﬀect of a one standard deviation in elevation — and one-sixth of a one stan-
dard deviation in distance from the nearest road. Income variables have a negligible eﬀect on
migration decisions. These calculations conﬁrm our earlier assessment.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Combining data from a household survey and an 11% census of the population, we have estimated
destination choice regressions for Nepalese internal migrants. Results show that population
density, social proximity, and access to amenities exert a strong inﬂuence on migrants’ choice
of destination. These results conﬁrm earlier work on the factors aﬀecting the subjective welfare
cost of isolation (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2008).
29Diﬀerentials in income and consumption expenditures across districts are signiﬁcant in uni-
variate comparisons but are found to be less important than expected once we control for
covariates. Income variables, whether measured in absolute or relative terms, are either not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant or have the wrong sign. Consumption expenditure variables are signiﬁcant
with a positive sign in some regressions, but the data do not enable us to distinguish whether
migrants respond to gains in absolute or relative consumption. Results are robust to diﬀerent
speciﬁcations and datasets.
The analysis reported here is based on one critical maintained assumption, namely, that
income and consumption levels obtained by district residents in the recent past can be used as
proxy for the anticipations of subsequent migrants. Undoubtedly it would be better to have
direct measurements of what migrants actually anticipate to earn and consume in diﬀerent
districts upon migration. Unfortunately such data is not available — and would be diﬃcult to
collect.
Taken together, our results suggest that an urban environment and access to amenities are
key considerations when internal migrants choose a migration destination. Anticipated income
and consumption expenditures, whether absolute or relative, appear secondary. This does not
imply that income diﬀerentials do not aﬀect the decision to migrate, an issue that we have
sidestepped by focusing on the choice of destination conditional on migrating.
It is diﬃcult to draw causal inference from observational data. This study is no exception.
The results presented here are nevertheless suﬃciently suggestive to cast doubt on the theory
that the choice of migration destination is driven primarily by income diﬀerentials. Other factors
seem to play a strong — and probably more important — role.
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35Table 1: Summary Statistics
  Work Migrant Adult Male
Age
    Mean 35.3 43.9
    Standard Deviation 10.6 13.9
Education (years)
    Mean 8.0 3.0
    Standard Deviation 5.0 4.3
Ethnicity (Percentage)
   Brahmin 34.5 11.7
   Chhetri 21.5 15.6
   Newar 7.4 7.9
   Tharu 3.1 6.7
   Magar 6.1 6.0
   Tamang 4.2 5.9
   Other 23.2 46.2
Language (Percentage)
   Nepali 73.9 45.3
   Maithili 6.2 13.2
   Bhojpuri 1.3 7.3
   Newar 4.4 6.1
   Tharu 2.0 5.8
   Tamang 3.7 5.5
   Other 8.5 16.8
Religion (Percentage)
   Hindu 89.6 81.0
   Buddheism 7.2 11.7
   Muslim 0.9 3.7
   Kirat 1.5 2.9
  Christian 0.6 0.3
  Others 0.2 0.4Table 2. Income and Consumption regressions using NLSS 95/96
Absolute: coef t-stat coef t-stat Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Log income 0.042 6.456 -3.055 -4.479 10.289 0.340 0.218 0.200 0.145 0.405
Log Consumption 0.038 7.916 -2.974 -5.873 10.325 0.340 0.196 0.138 0.184 0.304
Relative:
Relative log income 0.004 6.388 -0.292 -4.422 n.a. 0.021 0.020 0.014 0.039
Relative log consumption 0.004 7.860 -0.285 -5.826 n.a. 0.019 0.014 0.018 0.030
Consumption Adequacy Index:
   Food 0.008 1.922 -0.345 -0.801 1.496 0.213 0.130 0.121 0.120 0.249
   Clothing 0.006 1.593 -0.293 -0.752 1.357 0.196 0.052 0.101 0.059 0.217
   Housing 0.007 1.685 -0.220 -0.549 1.404 0.184 0.105 0.103 0.096 0.264
   Healthcare 0.004 0.990 -0.063 -0.164 1.412 0.198 0.077 0.112 0.063 0.237
   Children's Schooling -0.006 -1.426 0.900 2.069 1.444 0.201 0.051 0.120 0.043 0.302
   Total Income 0.006 1.944 -0.307 -0.920 1.251 0.156 0.069 0.098 0.067 0.195
Each line corresponds to a different regression. The estimator is weighted least squares, using sampling population weights.
District Level Premium for
Age Education High  caste District Fixed Effect Age Squared/10000Table 3. Comparing the actual destination to alternative destinations
All figures are relative to the district of origin Actual Mean in Diff. in mean
Destination Alt. Destin. t-stat
Income and consumption
Average income (log) 0.195 -0.037 -61.840
Differential in log income due to education and high caste -0.035 0.007 9.031
Average consumption expenditures (log) 0.075 -0.046 -33.561
Differential in log consumption due to education and high caste 0.020 0.018 -0.832
Relative log income -0.003 0.001 8.915
Relative log consumption 0.002 0.002 -1.001
Subjective consumption adequacy
Average consumption adequacy index: total income 0.054 -0.008 -35.523
Differential due to education and caste: total income 0.002 -0.016 -8.508
Average consumption adequacy index: food 0.094 -0.010 -44.127
Differential due to education and caste: food -0.008 0.014 7.844
Average consumption adequacy index: clothing 0.076 -0.019 -42.983
Differential due to education and caste: clothing -0.002 -0.019 -7.700
Average consumption adequacy index: housing 0.070 -0.028 -47.457
Differential due to education and caste: housing 0.002 -0.004 -2.195
Average consumption adequacy index: health care 0.081 -0.022 -46.605
Differential due to education and caste: health care -0.010 -0.009 0.255
Average consumption adequacy index: children schooling 0.093 -0.011 -45.711
Differential due to education and caste: children schooling -0.003 -0.022 -6.701
Prices and amenities
Log of rice price -0.089 0.021 47.802
Housing price premium (log) 0.377 0.210 -12.221
Time travel to nearest paved road -0.746 0.103 79.767
Time travel to nearest bank -0.373 0.091 71.345
Population and distance
Population density  0.281 -0.033 -86.131
Log(population)  0.330 -0.207 -74.129
Elevation in meters -0.317 0.166 57.156
Ethnic/caste similarity index -0.042 -0.060 -13.664
Language similarity index -0.123 -0.101 7.427
Religion similarity index 0.008 -0.017 -13.816
Distance in '000 Km 0.261 0.281 13.822Table 4. Income and the choice of migration destination
District difference in: coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Income
Average log income -0.185 -0.946 -0.188 -0.965
Differential in log income due to education and high caste -0.035 -0.359
Relative log income controlling for education and high caste -0.089 -0.087
Average consumption adequacy index: total income -0.958** -2.078
Differential due to education and caste: total income 0.479*** 3.041
Prices and amenities
Log of rice price -1.909** -2.001 -1.883** -1.977 -1.849** -1.973 -1.921** -2.163
Housing price premium (log) 0.188*** 3.005 0.188*** 2.993 0.182*** 2.916 0.182*** 2.924
Time travel to nearest paved road -0.951*** -9.579 -0.955*** -9.451 -0.920*** -8.893 -0.950*** -9.268
Time travel to nearest bank 0.107 0.430 0.118 0.473 0.146 0.639 -0.033 -0.119
Elevation in meters -0.575** -2.359 -0.579** -2.386 -0.630*** -2.855 -0.457* -1.857
Population
Population density  0.828*** 5.967 0.823*** 5.744 0.791*** 5.579 0.797*** 5.837
Log(population) 0.372** 2.046 0.376** 2.029 0.348* 1.912 0.400** 2.130
Ethnicity similarity index 1.685*** 7.170 1.686*** 7.169 1.701*** 7.039 1.668*** 7.163
Language similarity index 1.519*** 10.544 1.515*** 10.390 1.496*** 10.307 1.483*** 10.498
Religion similarity index -0.576 -1.376 -0.588 -1.427 -0.604 -1.468 -0.462 -1.037
Distance




The estimator is Fixed Effect Conditional Logit. Standard errors are corrected for clustering across district of origin.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.155 0.155 0.155 0.157
1,076,556 1,072,804 1,072,804 1,072,804
-57,089.55 -56,898.28 -56,910.66 -56,786.67Table 5. Consumption and the choice of migration destination
Consumption coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Average consumption expenditures (log) 0.140 0.635 0.232 1.007
Log consumption differential due to education and high caste 0.566*** 6.937
Combined average and differential 0.457*** 4.264 0.227 0.997
Relative log consumption controlling for education and ethnicity 5.609*** 7.143 3.548 1.584
Prices and amenities
Log of rice price -1.929** -2.100 -2.016** -2.340 -2.083** -2.378 -1.920** -2.154 -2.015** -2.340
Housing price premium (log) 0.186*** 2.887 0.188*** 2.900 0.195*** 3.196 0.180*** 2.871 0.187*** 2.865
Time travel to nearest paved road -0.881*** -9.904 -0.850*** -9.393 -0.790*** -8.492 -0.920*** -8.932 -0.854*** -9.412
Time travel to nearest bank 0.139 0.635 0.092 0.422 0.096 0.452 0.101 0.442 0.093 0.425
Elevation in meters -0.674*** -2.752 -0.693*** -2.957 -0.777*** -3.524 -0.607*** -2.949 -0.687*** -2.921
Population
Population density  0.783*** 5.504 0.878*** 6.290 0.842*** 6.239 0.887*** 6.489 0.878*** 6.292
Log(population) 0.334* 1.866 0.265 1.529 0.252 1.412 0.295* 1.719 0.266 1.536
Ethnicity similarity index 1.719*** 7.155 1.719*** 7.230 1.742*** 7.138 1.703*** 7.177 1.723*** 7.244
Language similarity index 1.485*** 10.484 1.589*** 11.198 1.548*** 10.771 1.608*** 11.181 1.592*** 11.210
Religion similarity index -0.578 -1.373 -0.529 -1.267 -0.508 -1.249 -0.552 -1.311 -0.526 -1.261
Distance




The estimator is Fixed Effect Conditional Logit. Standard errors are corrected for clustering across district of origin.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.156 0.157 0.155 0.157 0.157
1,072,804 1,072,804 1,076,556 1,072,804 1,072,804
-56,794.57 -56,773.81 -57,096.58 -56,776.16 -56,785.89Table 6. Income and the choice of migration destination -- using migrants from the NLSS 2002/3
District difference in: coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Average log income -0.888** -2.011 -0.888** -2.140
Differential in log income due to education and high caste -0.002 -0.007
Relative log income controlling for education and ethnicity 0.860 0.283
Average consumption adequacy index: total income -2.177*** -2.613
Differential due to education and caste: total income -0.384 -0.636
Prices and amenities
Log of rice price 2.160* 1.923 2.160* 1.907 1.873* 1.706 1.711 1.550
Housing price premium (log) 0.353*** 3.056 0.353*** 3.068 0.329*** 3.048 0.383*** 3.483
Time travel to nearest paved road -1.658*** -3.327 -1.658*** -3.245 -1.386** -2.541 -1.464*** -2.973
Time travel to nearest bank 0.939 1.356 0.940 1.284 0.979 1.385 0.744 1.123
Elevation in meters 0.105 0.273 0.105 0.278 -0.065 -0.156 0.231 0.603
Population
Population density  -0.384 -0.859 -0.384 -0.854 -0.531 -1.109 -0.571 -1.254
Log(population) 2.776*** 4.738 2.776*** 4.804 2.744*** 4.325 2.898*** 4.918
Ethnicity similarity index 0.915* 1.731 0.915* 1.698 0.925* 1.691 1.017* 1.794
Language similarity index 1.832*** 2.812 1.833*** 2.795 1.855*** 2.711 1.380* 1.859
Religion similarity index -0.743 -1.120 -0.743 -1.117 -1.066 -1.562 -0.392 -0.492
Distance




The estimator is Fixed Effect Conditional Logit. Standard errors are corrected for clustering across district of origin.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.390 0.390 0.388 0.394
16,214 16,214 16,214 16,214
-620.47 -620.47 -623.10 -617.00Table 7. Consumption and the choice of migration destination -- using migrants from the NLSS 2002/3
Consumption coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Average consumption expenditures (log) -0.163 -0.238 -0.161 -0.236
Log consumption differential due to education and high caste 0.069 0.236
Combined average and differential -0.007 -0.026 -0.108 -0.160
Relative log consumption controlling for education and ethnicity 0.484 0.155 1.566 0.188
Prices and amenities
Log of rice price 1.991 1.445 1.999 1.438 1.852* 1.685 1.854* 1.656 1.949 1.411
Housing price premium (log) 0.328*** 3.000 0.327*** 2.990 0.329*** 3.081 0.328*** 3.064 0.327*** 3.000
Time travel to nearest paved road -1.469** -2.402 -1.469** -2.400 -1.394** -2.560 -1.391** -2.573 -1.444** -2.379
Time travel to nearest bank 1.049 1.514 1.040 1.513 1.008 1.523 0.999 1.511 1.029 1.504
Elevation in meters -0.048 -0.116 -0.047 -0.115 -0.065 -0.158 -0.065 -0.158 -0.053 -0.126
Population
Population density  -0.504 -1.095 -0.496 -1.100 -0.532 -1.105 -0.527 -1.129 -0.509 -1.126
Log(population) 2.733*** 4.492 2.726*** 4.539 2.748*** 4.288 2.743*** 4.344 2.734*** 4.508
Ethnicity similarity index 0.897* 1.699 0.907* 1.722 0.912* 1.728 0.921* 1.733 0.910* 1.728
Language similarity index 1.917*** 2.981 1.926*** 3.044 1.860*** 2.727 1.865*** 2.811 1.906*** 3.021
Religion similarity index -1.036 -1.418 -1.036 -1.421 -1.065 -1.530 -1.066 -1.555 -1.045 -1.432
Distance




The estimator is Fixed Effect Conditional Logit. Standard errors are corrected for clustering across district of origin.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.388 0.388 0.388 0.388 0.388
16,214 16,214 16,214 16,214 16,214
-623.14 -623.10 -623.08 -623.06 -623.13Table 8. Relative magnitude of effect of regressors on choice of migration destination
Standard  Relative
Income and consumption deviation effect
Combined income effect 0.76 0.02
Relative log income controlling for education and ethnicity 0.06 -0.01
Combined consumption effect 0.56 0.19
Relative log consumption controlling for education and ethnicity 0.03 0.17
Prices and amenities
Log of rice price 0.29 -0.56
Housing price premium (log) 1.74 0.32
Time travel to nearest paved road 1.00 -0.92
Time travel to nearest bank 0.83 0.09
Elevation in meters 1.08 -0.67
Population
Population density  0.47 0.38
Log(population)  0.92 0.32
Ethnicity similarity index 0.17 0.28
Language similarity index 0.38 0.58
Religion similarity index 0.23 -0.12
Distance
Distance above 100 Km 0.18 -0.15
Relative effect of a one standard deviation calculated as coefficient x standard deviation,
averaged over the different regressions reported in Tables 4 and 5.Table A1. Hedonistic regression of house rental value
Coef. t-stat
Area of dwelling
Log(sq.ft of the dwelling) 0.179 (3.08)**
Log(sq.ft of the plot) -0.093 (1.91)        
Kitchen garden (yes=1) -0.202 (2.72)**
Number of rooms and room composition
Log(number of rooms) 0.553 (6.37)**
Share of Kitchen  -1.467 (0.69)        
Share of toilet/bathroom -2.619 (1.21)        
Share of bedrooms -2.113 (1.00)        
Share of living/dinning room] -1.517 (0.72)        
Share of office -1.185 (0.55)        
Share of mixed use room  -2.256 (1.07)        
Share of other rooms  -2.358 (1.11)        
Construction material of outside wall
Mud Bricks/stone (yes=1) -0.197 (1.66)        
Wood/branches (yes=1) -0.369 (2.36)*
Other (yes=1) -1.455 (7.90)**
Floor material
Wood, Stone,Cement/tile or other (yes=1) 0.461 (3.66)**
Roof material
Galvanized Iron (yes=1) 0.823 (6.75)**
Concrete, Cemnet(yes=1) 0.882 (4.90)**
Tiles/slate(yes=1) 0.44 (4.79)**
Characteristics of windows
Shutters (yes=1) 0.379 (4.43)**
Screen/glass(yes=1) 0.496 (2.64)**
Other (yes=1) -0.602 (2.32)*
Drinking water source
Covered Well/Hand Pump -0.25 (1.99)*
Open Well -0.309 (1.80)        
Other (yes=1) -0.474 (3.27)**
Amenities
Sanitary System (yes=1) 0.115 (0.88)        
Garbage Disposal (yes=1) 0.121 (0.78)        
Non-Flush/Communal Toilet (yes=1) -0.48 (2.90)**
No toilet (yes=1) -0.596 (3.47)**
Electric Light (yes=1) -0.003 (0.08)        
District dummies Yes
The dependent variable is the log of the rental value of the dwelling.
Rental value is either actual or estimated in case of owner occupation.






Father's education level 0.036
(2.60)**
Father's employment in non-farm sector 0.344
(3.61)**







The dependent variable is 1 if head was born outside district of residence
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%